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ABSTRACT 
In the 2004 Presidential Election social and wedge issues were among the most publicized 
mobilization tools utilized by the Bush Campaign.  Specifically, same-sex marriage has been 
suggested as a key wedge issue that may have mobilized voters, although research differs on its 
impact.  My contention is that these previous studies miss the point with regard to wedge issues, 
which is that they are useful on persuadable voters, and persuadable voters live in swing states.  I 
estimate a logit model using 2004 American National Election Studies survey data.  I utilize 
voters‟ decisions to turn out as the dependent variable and control for respondents‟ positions on 
terrorism, the economy, same-sex marriage, political interest, party identification, and socio-
economic status.  These findings demonstrate, consistent with my hypothesis, voters in swing 
same-sex marriage ballot measure states were more likely to turn out.  These voters may not have 
been persuadable, but rather the Republican base. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2004 Presidential Election and the use of the same-sex marriage wedge issue as a 
tactic to mobilize voters in it has been the subject of much debate in the last four years 
(Abramowitz 2004, Burden 2004, McDonald 2004, Hilligus and Shields 2005, Lewis 2005, Guth 
et al. 2006, Kaufmann 2006, Smith et al. 2006, Smith et al. 2006, Knuckey 2007, Campbell and 
Monson 2007, Campbell and Monson 2008).  Agreement on the effect of wedge and social 
issues, however, has proven elusive.  Using 2004 American National Election Study (ANES) 
data I estimate a logit model and find, consistent with the literature, that same-sex marriage 
ballot measures (SSMBM) at-large were insignificant predictors for voter turnout.  However, I 
find that the interaction of swing states with SSMBM makes respondents more likely to vote at a 
statistically significant level.  Respondents most opposed to same-sex marriage were also 
predicted to turnout by the model.  Thus, in states like Ohio and Michigan—two heavily sought 
swing states—those who would mobilize on social issues were able to use the issue of same-sex 
marriage, made salient by ballot initiatives, to make voters more likely to vote. 
While the topic of religious conservatives and their mobilization in the 2004 campaign is 
a worthwhile topic to study (see Campbell (ed.) 2007 for an extended discussion), I am 
specifically concerned with the use of wedge issue ballot measures and their effect on increasing 
the probability of voting.  Using same-sex marriage in 2004 as a test case for wedge issue ballot 
measures, my results suggest that wedge issues on ballot measures can increase the likelihood of 
a voter turning out if certain conditions apply.  Thus, in states like Ohio and Michigan—swing 
states—those who would mobilize on wedge issues were able to use the issue of gay marriage, 
made salient by ballot initiatives, to make voters more likely to vote.     
2 
This project continues as follows.  Part I reviews the relevant literature on wedge issues, 
mobilization and the 2004 election.  Part II presents a theory of how SSMBM was used as a 
wedge issue to mobilize conservative voters, particularly in swing states.  Part III identifies my 
methods and data collection, as well as the coding for the models presented.  Part IV 
demonstrates my findings, and outlines the next step in data analysis for this project.  And 
finally, Part V discusses limitations for the models presented, and adds suggestions for the next 
step of this research.  
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CHAPTER 2. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Issue Voting 
Issues can be divided into “position” and “valence” categories (Stokes 1963).  Position 
issues are defined by their “advocacy of government actions from a set of alternatives over 
which the distribution of voter preferences is defined” (Stokes 1963, 373).  More simply put, 
position issues are those issues where voters must prescribe to one candidate‟s policy remedy 
over the others—the voter must take a position.  Valence issues, conversely, need only have the 
voter make a positive or negative assessment of the candidate or party with whom an issue is 
associated (Stokes 1963).  Wedge issues are positional issues (Hillygus and Shields 2008).  
Candidates use these issues to set out some policy objective (i.e. limit or prohibit abortion, same-
sex marriage, stem cell research, allow school vouchers, etc.) in an effort to siphon off some 
portion of their oppositions‟ minimum winning coalition (Hillygus and Shields 2008).  Wedge 
issues are, however, not destined to remain as such forever. 
Issues generally, but wedge issues specifically, evolve (Carmines and Stimson 1989, 
Hillygus and Shields 2008).  Issue evolution affects actors in the political process in two ways.  
It, as the name suggests, changes issues in such a way that they may or may not be effective in 
mobilizing or attracting voters the way the issue once did, and it shifts the region of acceptability 
such that what may once have seemed extreme could be considered general popular opinion 
(Rabinowitz and McDonald 1989; Carmines and Stimson 1989).  Carmines and Stimson‟s 
(1989) theory of issue evolution is grounded on the notion that issues go through processes—not 
unlike biological natural selection—to determine which issues are best suited for public 
discourse or debate, and those that are best suited for exploitation by politicians.  Of course, the 
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“best” issues may not be the normatively “best,” or even the most important policy question 
before the citizens.  They are, instead, those issues that have meet era-specific requirements that 
enable them to move through the evolutionary mechanisms.  No matter where they are in the 
evolutional process, issues are constantly being used in elections and campaigns and can be 
categorized based on the ease of their use.     
For the purposes of elections issues fall into two categories: hard issues and easy issues 
(Carmines and Stimson 1980).  Hard and easy issues differ in the types of responses voters give 
them.  Easy issues get what have been termed “gut” responses from voters (Carmines and 
Stimson 1980).  Although hard issues elicit gut responses as well they must be thought about in 
careful, nuanced ways.  One distinction that Carmines and Stimson draw between voters is that 
“easy issue voters” are no more informed than the average non-voter (Carmines and Stimson 
1980).  Hard issue voters, conversely, are much better informed, and can sometimes be 
categorized as “single issue” or simply “issue” voters because they are focused so intently on 
their given issue (Carmines and Stimson 1980). With this in mind, wedge issues can be classified 
as easy issues for three reasons.   
First, most wedge issues, while position, met the requirement that the issue must be 
symbolic, not technical (Kandel 2006, Carmines and Stimson 1980).  The debate around same-
sex marriage, for instance, is symbolic because it focuses on the highly symbolic institution of 
marriage (Kandel 2006, Wedgewood 1999).  Additionally, the main avenue employed by those 
who would outlaw same-sex marriage is to have state constitutional amendments, despite the fact 
that George W. Bush declared he would seek an amendment to the constitution of the United 
States (CNN.com 2008).  These state initiatives would almost certainly come under the scrutiny 
of courts at some point in the future, whereas a U.S. constitutional amendment, assuming it 
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passed, would be above judicial review.  More to the point, ballot initiatives banning same-sex 
marriage simply rehash a debate ended by the 1996 Defense of Marriage Act, or DOMA (Pub. L. 
104-199, 100 Stat. 2419) (Domawatch.org 2008).  The DOMA first defined legal marriage as 
between a man and woman and then abdicated states from any responsibility of recognizing any 
relationship between individuals of the same sex.  Thus, the ballot initiatives themselves can be 
thought of as symbolic because they were not implementing new law, but codifying for states 
what had already been sanctioned in statue at the federal level. 
The next indicator of an easy issue is that it must deal with policy ends, not means 
(Carmines and Stimson 1980).  This is true of the same-sex marriage debate because the focus of 
the debate was solely on the prohibition same-sex marriage instead of what the actual 
constitutional channels were, or how difficult it would be to get a constitutional amendment 
passed that would officially declare it illegal (CNN.com).  Jonathan Kandel states that it was the 
focus on the ends of the policy—prohibiting same-sex marriage—that gave the issue some of its 
salience (Kandel 2006).  He points out that the gay rights frame—which focused primarily on the 
means of banning same-sex marriage and the problems with them—pushed by critics of the 
proposal never gained salience, so the ends were the only aspect of the policy considered in 
public debate (Kandel 2006).   
Finally, the last criterion to be met for an issue to be easy is for it to have been “long on 
the political agenda” (Carmines and Stimson 1980).  Same-sex marriage, or least gay rights, has 
been a prominent national issue since at least 1969 with the Stonewall riots (Brittanica.com 
2009; Haider-Merkel and Meier 1996).  Ballot measures have also been used before to affect 
policy with regard to gay rights.  In 1992, Oregon and Colorado placed initiatives on their ballots 
to eliminate sexual orientation from consideration in discrimination cases and new anti-
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discrimination laws (Haider-Merkel and Meier 1996).  By 2004, the debate about gay rights—
which culminated with the same-sex marriage bans on 11 states‟ ballots and a possible 
amendment to the U.S. constitution—had 12 years to be on the political agenda, and was 
sufficiently primed to motivate voters to go to the polls.  Whether or not it worked is another 
question.              
 
Mobilization and Ballot Measures 
 Mobilization for electoral contests is a war fought on many fronts.  Campaigns and 
parties rely on a combination of face-to-face canvassing, phone banks, media strategies, and 
candidate appearances to energize their supporters.  Some studies support the general theory—
without explicitly stating it—that as mobilization efforts have become more impersonal their 
effectiveness has also decreased (Putnam 2000, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  Testing that 
theory using experimental methods, Alan Gerber and Donald Green (2000) state that personal 
contact is in fact a more effective mobilization strategy.  Personal contact suggests a 9.8% 
increase in turnout, while direct mail—according to their model—increases turnout about 0.6% 
(Gerber and Green 2000).  Successful mobilization on wedge issues is generally dependent on 
person-to-person contact, and this is certainly the case for 2004 (Campbell and Monson 2008).  
Churches and religious organizations were vital to getting out the message and knocking on 
doors (Campbell and Monson 2007).  The key point about 2004 and wedge issues is that those 
who would be most activated by those issues were not mobilizing for an esoteric goal or 
ephemeral hope.  They had concrete evidence—in the form of a legally binding ballot measure—
that their policy objectives could be achieved with their efforts. 
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Stephen Nicholson, in Voting the Agenda (2005), claims that ballot measures can increase 
salience for an issue, prime voters to evaluate candidates differently that they would in the 
absence of that ballot measure, and mobilize voter turnout.  He demonstrates compelling 
evidence for ballot measure priming with Proposition 187—a ballot initiative to bar illegal 
immigrants from schools, social services, and non-emergency health facilities—and the 1994 
California governor‟s race (2005).  His probit analysis shows that voters who mentioned the 
ballot proposition significantly increased their likelihood of voting for the Republican Pete 
Wilson, regardless of their self-identified party.  Nicholson states that is was Republicans‟ 
campaigning on illegal immigration via Prop 187‟s presence on the ballot that primed voters just 
enough to give Wilson the victory (2005).  Furthermore, Nicholson shows that some voters 
would not vote at all in the absence of Prop 187 (2005).  There can certainly be problems for 
parties and candidates if they rely on ballot measures.  One such problem is absurdly high 
reading levels for ballot measure language (Reilly and Richey 2008), which could have the effect 
of confusing some voters.  The research on SSMBM readability has yet to find significant 
results, but the trend is toward more difficult readability.  Even with this potential hazard, 
research suggests that it can be effective in presidential elections as well. 
 Ballot initiatives, like same-sex marriage in the 2004 presidential election, have a varied 
literature with respect to their effects.  One aspect that is certain about ballot initiatives is that 
they have educative effects (Smith 2001).  That is, with all things equal, a ballot initiative raises 
awareness of an issue and increases its salience (Tolbert and Smith 2005).  Though there is 
conflicting scholarship on whether ballot initiatives are more important for mid-term or 
presidential elections, the general consensus is that initiatives mobilize voters—particularly ones 
with a deep interest for the issue in question—to the polls (Smith 2001; Tolbert et al. 2001; 
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Tolbert and Smith 2005).  Tolbert and Smith do go so far as to make the claim ballot initiatives 
have the capacity to effect the results of presidential elections given their uses by increasing the 
visibility and salience of an issue (2005).  Ballot initiatives that receive high amounts of 
spending—through mobilization efforts by candidates or issues advocacy groups—on their 
behalf have also been shown to increase issue salience and awareness (Nicholson 2003). 
 Even though ballot initiatives have proven educative effects, same-sex marriage and 
social issues were prominent news stories, and mobilization was predicated on both of these 
facts, same-sex marriage is not universally accepted as a motivator for turnout in 2004 
(Abramowitz and Stone 2006, Abramowitz 2004, Burden 2004, Hillygus and Shields 2005).  The 
only studies SSMBM having an effect do so with voting for Bush as the dependent variable 
(Campbell and Monson 2007), or at the aggregate level within very small geographic areas 
(LaFrance and Fredrick 2007, Smith, DeSantis and Kassel 2006). It is because of this debate that 
I propose to examine the issue once more to discern what effect same-sex marriage had on 
respondents to the 2004 Nation Election Study.  Scholarship on this topic has implications for 
ballot initiatives and social issues as mobilization tools.     
 
2004 Presidential Election 
The 2004 presidential election is notable because of the wedge issues and the role they 
are suspected to have played in that election (Campbell and Monson 2008).  The issue of same-
sex marriage (or social issues in general) and its effect in the 2004 presidential election has been 
the subject of much debate.  As was mentioned in the introduction, most media commentators 
and indeed the Bush campaign themselves attributed their victory—the first winning majority 
since 1988—to social issues and social conservatives coming out to vote (Abramowitz 2004, 
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Guth et. al. 2006, Campbell and Monson 2007).  Research, however, has offered myriad 
explanations for Bush‟s victory in 2004 including, but not limited to, support of President Bush‟s 
handling of terrorism, the general expansion of the Republican Party, and social issues. 
Approval of the handling of terrorism as an explanation was one of the first issues to 
receive traction in scholarly literature, and seems plausible as a motivator in 2004.  Because the 
terrorists‟ attacks of September 11, 2001 were still fresh in the minds of voters they could have 
been primed to evaluate the candidates on how they would handle another attack (Abramowitz 
2004; Kaufmann 2006; Burden 2004; Hillygus and Shields 2005).  Abramowitz, for instance, 
finds no significant relationship between same-sex marriage amendments being present on 
ballots and an increase in aggregate turnout by state in the 2004 election (2004).  He does find 
significant evidence for increased Bush support in the states most clearly affected by the 9/11 
attacks: New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.
1
  As an explanation of those findings 
Abramowitz suggests that Bush‟s win in 2004 was a simple expansion of his vote share from 
2000 because of terrorism, and in spite of same-sex marriage amendments (2004).   
Other research has shown that women—who have generally tended to vote Democratic 
(Kaufmann 2006)—voted for Bush because of questions about terrorism and who was best suited 
to lead the country on that issue, thus showing again that Bush‟s victory was a function of 
Republican Party expansion (Burden 2004).  As previously mentioned, however, terrorism was 
not the only issue that seemed to be on the minds of voters. 
The previous null findings notwithstanding, same-sex marriage and social issues have 
been found to have been important—to varying degrees—for the 2004 general election in a 
number studies (Lewis 2005, Smith, DeSantis and Kassel 2006, Knuckey 2007, Kaufmann 2006, 
                                                          
1
 This finding seems moot given that all three of these states are considered, and were in 2004, “Blue States.”  
Kandel offers his own perspective on the Red State-Blue State divide (2006).    
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McDonald 2004, Guth et. al. 2006, Campbell and Monson 2007, Campbell and Monson 2008).  
This research lacks a unified voice, however, because none of them have used dichotomous 
turnout as a dependent variable, and none of the studies seem to highlight where, if anywhere, 
the SSMBM were more effective.  There is agreement, even among those who demonstrate null 
findings for same-sex marriage as a predictor of voting, that same-sex marriage or social issues 
were important to voters in the abstract (Hillygus and Shields 2005; Knuckey 2007).  Hillygus 
and Shields point to exit polls for the 2004 election showed that “moral values” were important 
to 22% of voters, which is at least a percentage higher than any other category in the survey 
(Hillygus and Shields 2005).
2
  So, there is still room to clarify where the wedge issue of the 2004 
Presidential election had its effect, if it had any at all.   
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 I share the authors‟ complaint about same-sex marriage being lumped into the “moral values” category, and it is 
for that reason that I use the term “social issues” throughout the paper.  The point is, however, that those in favor or 
against same-sex marriage could declare it a moral issue.  Thus, the exit poll only serves to illustrate the fact that 
people thought same-sex marriage—or social issues in general—were important. 
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CHAPTER 3. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Research Question 
Theories on voter turnout and mobilization fall into two primary schools of thought.  The 
first is the base mobilization theory.  It states that voters will most often follow their partisan 
identification in the ballot box, and parties are the most effective at winning elections when they 
mobilize their partisan identifiers (Campbell et al. 1960; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; 
Wielhouwer and Lockerbie 1994; Bartels 2000; Green, Palmquist and Schickler 2002; 
Holbrooke and McClurg 2005).  Scholars note that that party mobilization is useful in mobilizing 
those who are the least likely to vote under normal circumstances—the poor, minorities, and the 
less educated (Rosenstone and Hanson 1993).  Most often, however, targets for mobilization by 
parties are not these groups, but instead those readily identify with a party (Brady, Scholzman, 
and Verba 1999).  Brady et al. state that this base mobilization is the result of parties seeking to 
maximize their scare resources (1999).  The work by Holbrooke and McClurg (2005) succinctly 
illustrates the prevailing position for adherents to the base mobilization thesis.   
Holbrooke and McClurg use three consecutive Presidential Elections—1992, 1996, and 
2000—to test the effect of campaign activity on aggregate turnout.  Their equivalent test for base 
mobilization is a measure of the “party transfers” between national and state political parties 
during an election.  Holbrooke and McClurg point out that these funds are used primarily to 
mobilize core part supporters, so an increase in these funds should demonstrate two substantive 
effects: increased base mobilization and attention to the electoral outcome in that state.  In all of 
their aggregate turnout models the party transfer variable is positive and significant.  They test 
their theory, as well, by making the proportion of independent from election to election the 
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dependent variable, and find that electoral context—things like Senate races and third party 
candidates—make the percentage of independents go up.  The variable that makes aggregate 
turnout more likely, party transfers, has no effect on the percentage of independents.  Holbrooke 
and McClurg summarize their project by saying the question for election scholars is no longer 
“do campaigns mobilize,” but “whom do campaigns mobilize (2005)?”             
Research offers more than one answer to that question.  For the preceding groups of 
scholars the answer is clearly partisans, but another school of thought would claim that 
campaigns mobilize persuadable voters (Hillygus and Shields 2008). The persuadable voter 
thesis is the primary challenger to the established base mobilization theory.  Building off of the 
considerable issue voting literature (Stokes 1963; Carmines and Stimson 1980; Aldrich, Sullivan, 
and Borgida 1989; Carmines and Stimson 1989; Petrocik 1996; Campbell 2002), Sunshine 
Hillygus and Todd Shields develop a new theory on voting in Presidential Elections.  Though 
rooted in issue voting, the persuadable voter thesis presumes the existence of “wedge issues” 
(Hillygus and Shields 2008).   
Wedge issues have been discussed in popular media for some time (see Hillygus and 
Shields 2008 for an extended review of newspaper and political operative quotes).  Hillygus and 
Shields‟ definition is as follows, “any policy concern that is used to divide the opposition‟s 
potential winning coalition (2008).”  They state that moral issues such as same-sex marriage and 
stem cell research are the classic wedge issues, but the war in Iraq or certain tax policies could 
very well serve the same goal—persuade people vote for a candidate based on one issue (see 
Bartels 2005 for an example of taxes being a wedge issue).  They test this theory using vote 
defections by identified partisans.  They demonstrate that the odds of Democrats voting for 
Republicans and vice versa are made less likely the more partisan a voter is.  Also, they show 
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that being cross-pressured on moral issues in 2004 makes voters more likely to vote against their 
party‟s candidate.  They also infer that leaning partisans and voters who typify one party‟s 
typical voter (i.e. church-going Democrats) are more likely to receive direct mail, or get a door-
to-door canvasser.  All of this leads Hillygus and Shields to claim that voters can be persuaded, 
and that it is persuasion on wedge issues that can make the difference in an election. 
With the preceding discussion in mind, I propose my own method to test both the base 
mobilization thesis and the persuadable voter thesis.  I do so with American National Election 
Study (ANES) data from 2004 when same-sex marriage was the primary wedge issue of the 
campaign.  My theory is that if one is to see the effects of a persuasion campaign it will be seen 
in two places, one geographical and one voter characteristic.  The geographic locations are swing 
states.  We know that campaigns spend an inordinate amount of time on specific states that are 
possible for either candidate to win.  Daron Shaw (2005) states that voters in swing states are less 
knowledgeable than voters generally, which suggests that they may not be as effective at 
countering arguments made by opinion leaders like political candidates.  The voter characteristic 
that would demonstrate the presence or absence of mobilization is that of religion.  Numerous 
studies have demonstrated that religion played a large role in the 2004 campaign (Campbell and 
Monson 2007, Campbell and Monson 2008).  Hillygus and Shields also note the effort of the 
Bush campaign to target those who were even marginally religious (2008).  Given what we know 
about ballot measures, the knowledge levels of swing state voters, religion, and the role of party 
identification the key persuadable voters in the 2004 election were anti-same-sex marriage 
Democrats.  Same-sex marriage ballot measures should make them more likely to vote.  Also, 
swing states with same-sex marriage ballot measures will be made more likely to vote because of 
the concentration of media coupled with low political knowledge generally. 
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Hypotheses 
 Based on the theoretical framework there are two hypotheses for how the state level 
factors—swing state status and SSMBM—will affect turnout.  They are as follows: 
   H1:  Voters in swing states will be more likely to turn out. 
   H2:  Voters in states with SSMBM will be more likely to turn out. 
Hypothesis one should be confirmed in spite of low political knowledge, and because campaigns 
concentrate a large portion of their effort on these states (Shaw 2008).  Testing these hypotheses 
will fill in the gaps in the literature with regard to wedge issues and ballot measures.  At this 
point, scholarship is silent on if these are useful or effective tools for mobilization.   
 To adequately test the persuadable voter and mobilization theses I propose two 
hypotheses.  Hypothesis three test for persuasion. 
   H3:  Democrats who are against same-sex marriage should be more likely to turn out. 
If, however, the mobilization thesis is correct for the 2004 Presidential Election we should expect 
hypothesis four. 
   H4:  Republican should be more likely to vote than Democrats. 
Hypothesis three is tested using an interaction of Democrats and those against same-sex 
marriage.  Hypothesis four is tested under the full model with no conditioning interaction.     
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CHAPTER 4. 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
Data 
The data I used to construct my dataset was taken from the 2004 ANES.  My dependent 
variable, the choice of the respondent to vote or not to vote, was coded dichotomously with “1” 
equaling the decision to vote.  A discrete dependent variable requires that I use a logit model to 
estimate the probabilities of turning out.  The variables that literature suggests predict turnout—
age, education, income, gender, and race—are controlled for in the models (Campbell et al. 
1960, Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Lewis-Beck et al. 2008).
3
  To gauge the attention and 
interest of the NES respondents I develop an index from 5 questions on the survey (α = .66).  I 
have created this index because research tells us that those who pay more attention are more 
likely to be politically knowledgeable and vote (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996).  The scores 
range from “0,” implying that the respondent has little to no interest or attention in the 2004 race, 
to “1,” meaning that the respondent is highly attentive or has close to maximum interest in the 
campaign. A control for party identification—a strong indicator of turnout (Campbell et al. 
1960)—is developed by making two dichotomous variables.  I take all ANES respondents who 
claim to be at least Independent-Republicans (so too with Democrats) to be “Republicans.”  
Thus, there is a Republican variable and a Democrat variable with Independents being the absent 
category.     
Controls for issues in the 2004 election are respondents‟ approval of the economy and 
their emphasis on terrorism as a foreign policy challenge.  Both of these issues were important to 
the campaign, and they have proven significant in previous research (Abramowitz 2004, Hillygus 
and Shields 2005, Elder and Greene 2007, LaFrance and Fredrick 2007).  The respondents‟ 
                                                          
3
 A detailed explanation of the coding process, survey questions, and possible responses are included in Appendix 2 
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positions on same-sex marriage are made dichotomous from the original ANES variable.  The 
ANES asked respondents to choose between marriage, civil unions, and no formal recognition of 
any kind.  Similar to the party identification specification, this trichotomous position scale allows 
me to control for those for and against same-sex marriage.  There are some who would disagree 
with “civil unions” being a separate category (Wedgewood 1999) because it is considered anti-
same-sex marriage; however I follow Hillygus and Shields‟ (2008) contention that some citizens 
do see civil unions as compromise policy position.  Finally, the presence of a SSMBM was 
dichotomous with the presence equal to “1.”   
Throughout literature on voter turnout the “South” (i.e. the 11 states of the former 
Confederacy) is controlled for based on its historically low turnout (Rosenstone and Wolfinger 
1978), so I, too, control for respondents from southern states with a dichotomous variable.  
Research indicates that higher income earners, better educated, and older voters are more likely 
to vote (Campbell et al. 1960, Piven and Cloward 2000).  I expect these variables to hold to their 
historical pattern.  For the presence of a gubernatorial or senate race I use CNN.com‟s election 
webpage from 2004.  A summary of the variables is displayed in Table 1. 
 
Methods 
 I use Stata 10.1 to estimate a logit model.  Logit models estimate the probability of some 
event occurring.  The coefficients are not directly interpretable, and the interpretation of 
interaction terms is also problematic (Ai, Norton, and Wang 1999).  To avoid the complications 
with these interpretations I use Clarify (King et al. 2000).  Clarify estimates predicted 
probabilities that are directly interpretable, and allows for the manipulation of those estimates.  
Thus, when all variables are set to mean or modal categories one can observe the direct effect of 
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a one unit change by the variable of interest on the odds of the dependent variable—in this case 
voting—occurring.    Clarify also produces a confidence interval for each predicted probability 
Table 1: Summary of Variables 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Swing State w/ SSMBM 1212 0.137 0.344 0 1 
Anti-GM Democrat 1146 0.227 0.419 0 1 
SSMBM 1212 0.200 0.400 0 1 
Swing State 1212 0.410 0.492 0 1 
Anti-SSM 1146 0.615 0.486 0 1 
Pro-SSM 1146 0.349 0.476 0 1 
Terrorism 1101 2.890 0.324 1 3 
Economy 1171 1.238 1.252 0 3 
Republican 1212 0.438 0.496 0 1 
Democrat 1212 0.403 0.490 0 1 
Senate 1212 0.736 0.441 0 1 
Governor 1212 0.109 0.312 0 1 
Attn. Index 1212 0.469 0.288 0 1 
Education 1212 4.188 1.621 1 7 
Income 1042 11.894 6.368 1 23 
Age 1212 48.684 17.086 18 90 
Age
2
 1212 2661.91 1735.31 324 8100 
White 1186 0.744 0.418 0 1 
Male 1212 0.554 0.497 0 1 
South 1212 0.348 0.476 0 1 
 
which assists in the interpretation of the change in independent variable.  Box plots based on the 
Clarify estimates testing the hypotheses are contained in the Discussion.   To account for 
heteroskedasticity, which could bias my results, I calculate robust standard errors clustered on 
the respondent‟s state for the models making Type 1 errors less probable (Graves 2003).  To test 
model fit I use both receiver operator characteristic curves (ROC) and estimated percent 
correctly predicted calculations (Herron 1999).  ROC curves demonstrate how much of the 
variance of the dependent variable is explained by the model (Richey 2008), while ePCP 
represents the percentage of correctly predicted 0s and 1s in the model.   
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CHAPTER 5. 
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
            The model in Table 2 is the basic version of this project‟s turnout model.  Included are 
the socio-economic status indicators that have historically predicted turnout in the American 
electorate.  This model conforms to the expected direction for each variable with the exception of 
income.  Income is generally predictive of higher turnout, but education could be soaking up 
most of income‟s statistical power.  Also in the model are two state-level variables—SSMBM 
and swing state status.  Per the theory, swing state voters should be less likely to turnout, while 
SSMBM states should be more likely.  Swing state status is negative and statistically significant, 
but SSMBM are negative as well.  This is contrary to the theory, but because the coefficient 
lacks statistical significance there is little we can glean from it at this time.  The estimated 
percent correctly predicted (ePCP) is about 80% suggesting that this model specification is 
accurately predicting about 80% of the turnout decisions in 2004.  This model is presented to 
make the point that the ANES 2004 sample performs the way American electoral behavior 
scholars expect. 
Table 2: Basic Model for Voter Turnout in 2004 
Variable Coefficient Robust S.E. 
SSMBM -1.120   1.046 
Swing State -1.946   0.561*** 
Republican 3.394   0.743*** 
Democrat 1.477   0.907 
Education 0.931   0.411* 
Income -0.023   0.062 
Age 0.204   0.104
+
 
Age
2 
-0.001   0.001 
White  1.207   0.778 
Male -0.274   0.738 
South -0.748   0.490 
Constant -8.619   3.478* 
N = 913;
+
 p < .10, *p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Robust Standard Errors are clustered on 27 
states; ROC Curve = .8591; Wald χ2 = 30.49, p < .001; ePCP = .791 
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Table 3 demonstrates the full model without interactions.  Added to this model are the 
attention index, issue positions, state-level electoral races, and party identification for each 
respondent.  
Table 3: Full Model for Voter Turnout in 2004 
Variable Coefficient         Robust S.E. 
SSMBM -1.281 0.772
+
 
Swing State -1.035 0.637 
Anti-Gay Marriage -0.247 0.466 
Pro-Gay Marriage -0.456 0.371 
Terrorism 0.161 1.022 
Economy -.0173 0.073* 
Senate -0.370 0.907 
Governor 2.546 1.710 
Democrat 1.889 1.534 
Republican 4.211 1.688* 
Att. Index 10.006 2.471*** 
Education 0.653 0.350 
Income 0.111 0.071 
Age 0.183 0.087* 
Age
2
 -0.001 0.0008* 
White 1.394 0.800 
Male -2.369 1.220
+
 
South -0.0257 0.737 
Constant -12.699 4.379 
N = 843;  + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Robust Standard Errors are clustered on 
27 states; ROC Curve .9566; Wald χ2 = 1906.91, p < .001; ePCP = .878  
 
Swing states are still negative, but they are no longer significant predictors of (non) turnout.  The 
issue positions are all insignificant as well.  Interestingly, voters with SSMBM are less likely to 
turnout according to this model.  This is contrary to the hypothesized direction, but the 
interaction of SSMBM and Swing States still poses some possibility.  Other variables that are 
significant—Republicans and Attention Index—have interesting implications.  Specifically, if 
the persuadable voter thesis is correct, we should not see a difference between the likelihood of 
Republicans and Democrats to vote.  This appears to be the case, but the Democrat coefficient is 
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insignificant.  To fully test the persuadable voter hypothesis, I now move to the interactive 
models.  
Table 4 displays the tests for the interactive hypotheses.  Specifically, I expect that voters 
in swing states with SSMBM will more likely to vote, and that Democrats who are against same 
sex marriage should be made more likely to vote if the SSMBM are to be considered effective 
mobilization tools.  I include the constituent terms so as not to bias the model (Brambor et al. 
2006).  In the first model, I test for swing states with SSMBM.  The effects of party 
identification—Republicans being likely to vote—are present and still significant, which gives 
weight to the proponents of base mobilization.     
Table 4:  Interaction Models for Voter Turnout in 2004 
Variable Coeff. Robust S.E. Coeff. Robust S.E. 
Swing x SSMBM 2.687 1.632
+
 -------- --------- 
Anti-GM x Dem ---------- ----------- 0.271 0.406 
SSMBM -2.815 1.118
+ 
-1.279 0.771
+
 
Swing State -1.833 0.721* -1.057 0.653 
Anti-GM -0.261 0.442* -.416 0.641 
Pro-GM -0.390 0.355 -.465 0.372 
Terror 0.392 1.026 .178 1.010 
Economy -0.151 0.076* -.170 0.072* 
Senate 0.066 0.972 -.372 0.903 
Governor 2.385 1.623 2.500 1.683 
Democrat 1.824 1.484 1.682 1.361 
Republican 4.078 1.649* 4.178 1.661* 
Att. Index 9.366 2.152*** 9.989 2.479*** 
Education 0.602 0.334
+
 .657 0.348
+
 
Income 0.117 0.071 .110 0.070 
Age 0.179 0.089* .182 0.087* 
Age
2
 -0.001 0.0009
+
 -.001 0.0008
+
 
White 1.127 0.968 1.417 0.806
+ 
Male -2.264 1.164
+
 -2.345 1.228
+
 
South 0.719 0.966 -.0251 0.740 
Constant -13.206            3.914            -12.585  
N=843; + p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001; Robust SE are clustered on 27 states; ROC 
Curve = (1) .9559, (2) .9569; Wald χ2 = (1) 725.71, p < .001, (2) 4503.98, p <.001; ePCP = (1) 
.883, (2) .879 
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The variable of interest is “Swing SSMBM.”  It is significant at the .10 level, and positive.  The 
ePCP and ROC curves both demonstrate that the models are generally good at estimating the 
decision to turnout in 2004.  Though the positive and significant coefficient in the first Table 4 
model suggests that my theory is correct, further investigation is warranted.   
Tested in the second model is the anti-sex marriage Democrat interaction.  This 
interaction is also positive, but statistically insignificant.  As with the swing states with SSMBM, 
the positive direction of the coefficient is hopeful for the persuadable voter theory, but without 
significance there is not much that can be inferred.  A better test is a three-way interaction using 
Democrats who are anti-same sex marriage and live in SSMBM states.  There is simply not 
enough data to appropriately test that variable with the data presented here.  I larger dataset or a 
panel data model could allow for such an interaction.  To further parse the effects of the 
interactions I estimate predicted probabilities using Clarify (King et al. 2000) presented in Figure 
1
4
.    
The first box plot of the table displays the results of the basic model by estimating the 
probability for voting in 2004 with the variable values set at their mean or modal categories.  A 
white man
5
, living in a non-swing state without a SSMBM, but who is generally concerned about 
terrorism, disapproving of the economy, making around $30,000 a year with a high school 
diploma, who pays some attention to the campaign, and average party identification—one might 
say an “average voter” at-large—has about a 70% chance of going to the polls on Election Day.  
This finding is difficult to square with reality when turnout was actually around 60% for the 
voting eligible population (McDonald 2004).  Consequently, over-reporting of turnout in the 
                                                          
4
 At-Large: Swing (0), SSMBM (0), Terror (mean), Economy (mean), Anti-SSM (1), Pro-SSM (0), Index (.25), 
South (0), Senate (1), Governor (0), Rep (mean), Dem (mean), Education (mean), Income (mean), Age (mean), Age
2
 
(mean), White (mean), Male (mean), South (0); Estimated in Stata 10.1, See King et al. (2000) for information on 
Clarify  
5
 Research suggests that men who did not turnout in 2000 were the targets of the Bush Campaign.  This is the reason 
men are referenced for the predicted probabilities (Kauffman 2006, Elder and Greene 2007). 
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ANES is one limitation to this project.   Other problematic aspects are the confidence intervals.  
They are quite wide making substantive interpretation difficult.  The chances of the average 
voter at-large turning out range from less than 40% to over 85%, which is too large to draw any 
solid conclusions, and does not directly test the hypotheses. 
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
Note:  2004 ANES data, Predicted Probabilities obtained via Clarify
At-Large SSMBM
Swing States w/ SSMBM
P(vote=1)
 
Figure 1:  Predicted Probabilities for Voter Turnout in 2004 
 Per the theory, I expect that SSMBM will make voters more likely to turn out.  The 
average voter at-large has about a 70% chance of turning out.  McDonald (2004) states that 
turnout was actually around 60%.  According the data used in this project, voters who lived in 
states with SSMBM with all of the average characteristics had between 15 and 30% chance of 
turning out, within the 90% confidence intervals.  This is an underwhelming result, and suggests 
that the presence of SSMBM may not have been enough to motivate voters to turnout. 
 The last box plot displays the result for the swing states with SSMBM interaction 
hypothesis in Table 3.  The chances for average voters to turnout in these states are somewhat 
better.  The high-end of the 90% confidence interval around 40%, but this is still well below the 
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chances of the average voter to turnout.  These box plots indicate that average voters in swing 
states with SSMBM are only marginally more likely to vote than voters in SSMBM generally.  
Thus, the theory and hypotheses remain unconfirmed by these estimations.         
 A robust test of the theory would be to estimate the probability of a Republican or 
Democrat turning out to vote in SSMBM swing states.  Unfortunately, the data would be 
compromised to such an extent as to render any results difficult to justify with reality.  I therefore 
refer to Table 4 to conclude the findings for the last hypothesis.  Democrats against same-sex 
marriage were not predicted to turnout at a statistically significant level.  The coefficient is 
positive, but without significance there is little one can say about this finding.  Furthermore, the 
anti-same-sex marriage variable tests these voters at large.  There is no way to know if these 
voters live in swing states, non-swing states, or SSMBM states.  Three-way interactions would 
prove useful, but, as has been stated, the data would be compromised in such as way as to render 
it useless.  A dataset with more respondents or a cross-sectional time series could make a three-
way interaction more viable.  Though the theory is not confirmed the death knell has yet to 
sound.       
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CHAPTER 6. 
CONCLUSIONS 
 The debate about persuasion versus base mobilization is a persistent one in American 
electoral behavior.  Each election there appears to be one issue that trumps all others presumably 
making voters rethink their eventual vote choice, and is given credit for taking one candidate to 
victory.  In 2004, that issue was same-sex marriage (Campbell and Monson 2007).  Some 
scholars claim that wedge issue made the difference for George W. Bush in 2004 by persuading 
Democrats to vote for him—the Republican—in contradiction to their other policy positions 
(Hillygus and Shields 2008).  Also, there is ample reason to think that the presence of wedge 
issue ballot measures and the state in which they were found affected the degree to which voters 
turned out in 2004 (Nicholson 2005, Shaw 2008).  I test those theories by using a logit model and 
calculating predicted probabilities in Clarify. 
 For the persuadable voter thesis to be correct Democrats who lived in the swing states 
with SSMBM should be more likely to vote, all else being equal.  Testing the persuadable voter 
theory on turnout is important because what politicians ultimately want to do is change the 
electorate in their favor.  This can be accomplished, as Hillygus and Shields state, by observing 
party identifying vote defectors.  A more robust test is, as this project does, to utilize turnout 
because if wedge issues are able to entire portions of the electorate—Democrats who are against 
same-sex marriage, for instance—then persuasion is certainly a profitable tactic.  Unfortunately 
for those in the persuadable voter camp, this project finds no evidence to substantiate their claim.  
The coefficient for Democrats who are against same-sex marriage is positive but insignificant.  
Furthermore, the models presented here lack the statistical power to estimate three-way 
interactions for the location of these voters. 
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 It seems that the presence of SSMBM at-large had no effect on turnout in 2004.  In fact, 
the insignificant coefficient is negative contrary to the hypothesized direction.  Living in a swing 
state is indicative of lower probabilities for turnout, but again the lack of statistical significance 
limits the amount one can say about that finding.  Voters living in swing states with SSMBM 
were more likely to vote at the .10 level.  The extreme significance of Republicans turnout out to 
vote coupled with the insignificance of Democrats turnout out to vote seems to suggest that there 
was little persuasion going on in 2004.  The SSMBM in swing states may have motivated 
turnout, but those voters were likely the Republican base.  However, to substantiate that claim 
more research will have to be done.  A cross-sectional time series using two decades or more of 
Presidential Elections would be better able to test that hypothesis. 
 One of the limitations is the over-reporting of voter turnout in the 2004 NES.  While this 
is an unavoidable problem, the results must be taken into consideration with the over-reporting in 
mind.  Secondly, using more than one election and more than one wedge issue would be the next 
evolution of any project like this.  There is limited generalizability from any study using only 
one election, but this research does suggest that this is an area worthy of scholarship.  Knowing 
if the electorate can be changed—rather than campaigns mobilizing the same voters over and 
over—is important both for academic purposes and practical political reasons.  
 In summary, those who suggest that wedge issues as a mobilization tools are red herrings 
may not be correct.  Growing research suggests that wedge issues may have, in fact, played a 
role in the 2004 campaign helping George W. Bush get reelected (Lewis 2005, Smith et al. 2006, 
Hillygus and Shields 2008, Campbell and Monson 2008).  This research adds to that chorus and 
goes further to suggest that it was in swing states where same-sex marriage ballot measures and 
possible mobilization efforts had the most effect.  The proposals for further research should 
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make the results of this research more solid, and move the literature on wedge issues, ballot 
measures, and their effects on mobilization forward.   
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APPENDIX: ANES QUESTION NAMES AND WORDING 
v043299: What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you? 
White (non-hispanic) = 1 
Hispanic = 2 
Black = 3 
 
V041109a: Respondent’s gender 
Male = 1 
Female = 0 
 
v043294: Respondent’s income 
01. A. None or less than $2,999 
02. B. $3,000 -$4,999 
03. C. $5,000 -$6,999 
04. D. $7,000 -$8,999 
05. E. $9,000 -$10,999 
06. F. $11,000-$12,999 
07. G. $13,000-$14,999 
08. H. $15,000-$16,999 
09. J. $17,000-$19,999 
10. K. $20,000-$21,999 
11. M. $22,000-$24,999 
12. N. $25,000-$29,999 
13. P. $30,000-$34,999 
14. Q. $35,000-$39,999 
15. R. $40,000-$44,999 
16. S. $45,000-$49,999 
17. T. $50,000-$59,999 
18. U. $60,000-$69,999 
19. V. $70,000-$79,999 
20. W. $80,000-$89,999 
21. X. $90,000-$104,999 
22. Y. $105,000-$119,000 
23. Z. $120,000 and over 
 
v043254: Respondent’s education level 
0. NA/DK number of grades; no HS diploma 
1. 8 grades or less and no diploma or equivalency 
   [0-8 in Y3, 5 in Y3a] 
2. 9-11 grades, no further schooling (incl. 12 years 
   without diploma or equivalency) [9-12 in Y3, 5 in Y3a] 
3. High school diploma or equivalency test [0-12 in Y3, 
   1 in Y3a] 
4. More than 12 years of schooling, no higher degree 
   (13-17 in Y3, 96 in Y3b) 
5. Junior or community college level degrees (AA 
   degrees) (07 in Y3b) 
6. BA level degrees; 17+ years, no advanced degree 
   (01 in Y3b) 
7. Advanced degree, including LLB [13-17 in Y3, 2-6 
   in Y3b] 
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v043250: Respondent’s age 
17- 90 
 
v045018x: Summary: vote and registration status 
1. R voter 
0. R nonvoter - registered 
0. R nonvoter - not registered 
0. R nonvoter - DK/RF if registered 
0. R nonvoter - not required to register 
 
v041202: Respondent’s home state 
01.Alabama, 02. Alaska, 04. Arizona, 05. Arkansas, 06. California, 08. Colorado, 09. Connecticut, 10. Delaware, 11. 
Washington DC, 12. Florida, 13. Georgia, 15. Hawaii, 16. Idaho, 17. Illinois, 18. Indiana, 19. Iowa, 20. Kansas, 21. 
Kentucky, 22. Louisiana, 23. Maine, 24. Maryland, 25. Massachusetts, 26. Michigan, 27. Minnesota, 28. 
Mississippi, 29. Missouri, 30. Montana, 31. Nebraska, 32. Nevada, 33. New Hampshire, 34. New Jersey, 35. New 
Mexico, 36. New York, 37. North Carolina, 38. North Dakota, 39. Ohio, 40. Oklahoma, 41. Oregon, 42. 
Pennsylvania, 44. Rhode Island, 45. South Carolina, 46. South Dakota, 47. Tennessee, 48. Texas, 49. Utah, 50. 
Vermont, 51. Virginia, 53. Washington, 54. West Virginia,55. Wisconsin, 56. Wyoming 
 
Attention/Interest Index (Cronbach’s α = .66) 
v045001: Interest in political campaigns 
Very = 1 
Some = .5 
Not = 0 
 
v045002: Did R watch programs about the campaign on TV 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
 
v045004: Did R read about campaign in any magazines 
Great deal = 1 
Quite a bit = .75 
Some = .5 
Very little = .25 
None = 0 
 
v45005: Did R listen to campaign speeches or discussions on radio 
Yes = 1 
No = 0 
 
v45006: How much attention did R give to presidential campaign new in general 
Great deal = 1 
Quite a bit = .75 
Some = .5 
Very little = .25 
None = 0 
 
v043026: Does R approve or disapprove of president’s handling of the economy 
34 
Approve = 1 
Disapprove = 0 
 
v043116: Party Identification (folded into partisanship scale) 
Strong R/D = 4 
Weak R/D = 3 
Ind. R/D = 2 
Independent = 1 
 
v045107: US foreign policy goals: combat int’l terrorism 
Very important = 5 
Somewhat = 3 
Not = 1 
 
V043210: R position on gay marriage 
Illegal = 5 
Civil Unions = 3 
Legal = 1 
 
